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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Edward Ross appeals from the denial of his motion 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his 
criminal sentence.  He asserts that his trial and appellate 
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counsel rendered ineffective assistance to him when they 
failed both to challenge a deficient jury instruction and to 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on one of his counts 
of conviction.  Because we conclude that he has not satisfied 
a threshold requirement of section 2255, we will remand the 
case to the District Court with directions to dismiss the 
motion.   
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
Ross was a drug dealer in Chester, Pennsylvania.  
Between March 25 and April 22, 2004, an undercover 
detective made four purchases of cocaine from him, and, on 
three of those occasions, surveillance officers watched Ross 
leave a residence at 2115 Madison Street and drive directly to 
a location agreed upon with the detective.  The detective 
arranged a fifth cocaine purchase for April 23, 2004.  Before 
that purchase took place, however, the police obtained a 
warrant to search 2115 Madison Street.  When police officers 
saw Ross leave the residence and get into his car, they 
arrested him in the driveway.  The officers searched his car 
and found four bags of cocaine and a loaded Colt .38 caliber 
handgun.   
 
After the arrest, the police executed the search warrant 
for the residence.  They discovered, among other things, a .25 
caliber semi-automatic handgun, and a loaded 9mm pistol.  
Originally, the 9mm pistol had been semi-automatic, but the 
firing pin had been replaced with a submachine gun firing pin 
that enabled the gun to fire continuously.  At Ross’s 
subsequent criminal trial, an expert from the Bureau of 
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Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms testified that the 9mm pistol, 
as modified, met the definition of a machinegun set forth in 
26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).     
 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In March 2006, a federal grand jury returned a 
superseding indictment charging Ross with four counts of 
distribution of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) 
(counts 1-4); possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or 
more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (count 
5); carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug 
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (count 
6); possession of a machinegun in furtherance of a drug 
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) 
(count 7); possession of a machinegun, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(o) (count 8); and two counts of possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1) (counts 9 and 10).     
 
Ross’s case went to trial.  After the parties had finished 
presenting evidence, the district court instructed the jury; 
however, regarding count 8, the court did not say – and 
Ross’s trial counsel failed to object and insist – that as part of 
proving Ross possessed a machinegun, the government was 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had 
specific knowledge of the firearm’s characteristics that made 
it a “machinegun” as defined by statute, specifically 26 
U.S.C. § 5845(b).  The jury found Ross guilty on all counts.   
 
At sentencing, because Ross had a prior conviction for 
a felony drug trafficking offense and was also, on count 5, 
convicted of an offense involving 500 grams or more of 
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cocaine, he was subject to a mandatory minimum penalty of 
10 years’ imprisonment.  He was further subject to a 
mandatory consecutive term of 30 years’ imprisonment 
because he was, on count 7, convicted of possessing a 
machinegun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.  The 
district court found that Ross was a career offender under 
section 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines and 
sentenced him to concurrent terms of 10 years’ imprisonment 
on counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 10, followed by a consecutive 
term of 30 years’ imprisonment on count 7.  The court 
imposed a total term of eight years’ supervised release, a fine 
of $3,000, and an $800 special assessment – that is, $100 for 
each count of conviction.  On the government’s motion, the 
district court dismissed counts 6 and 9.   
 
Ross filed a direct appeal.  He argued that the district 
court erroneously concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) 
required the imposition of thirty years’ imprisonment on 
count 7, that the court further erred by increasing his 
mandatory minimum sentence based on a prior conviction, 
and that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he had 
violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  He also challenged the 
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o) and 922(g)(1).  On 
April 27, 2009, we affirmed his conviction.  United States v. 
Ross, 323 F. App’x 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 
Sixteen months later, in August 2010, Ross filed his 
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2255, and he filed a supplemental motion in 
September 2013.  The District Court denied those motions 
and refused to issue a certificate of appealability.  The Court 
predicted that we would apply the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 
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(1994), and would conclude that Ross’s conviction under 
section 922(o) was unlawful because the jury was not 
required to find that Ross had specific knowledge of the 9mm 
pistol’s firing characteristics.  Nevertheless, the Court 
reasoned that any error with respect to Ross’s conviction 
under section 922(o) did not cause prejudice under Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for two reasons: first, 
because Ross is classified as a Category VI career criminal, 
and so the section 922(o) conviction could not change his 
criminal history category in any future federal sentencing 
proceeding; second, because, even if the section 922(o) 
conviction were vacated, Ross would not be released from 
custody any sooner given the concurrency of his sentence for 
that count with the time he had to serve on other counts of 
conviction.     
 
Ross timely appealed.  He chose to apply directly to us 
for a certificate of appealability, which we granted.  The 
certificate of appealability limited Ross to raising the issue of 
whether his trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to argue that the government introduced 
insufficient evidence to convict him of possessing a 
machinegun as charged in count 8 and that the jury 
instructions did not require the jury to find as an essential 
element of that crime that he knew of the characteristics of 
the firearm that brought it within the statutory definition of 
“machinegun.”  (App. at 23.)  In the certificate of 
appealability, we stated that, “jurists of reason would debate 
the District Court’s conclusion that appellant did not suffer 
prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984),” and, in particular, we noted that it was debatable 
whether “his conviction under § 922(o) did not increase his 
actual sentence and would have no effect under the federal 
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Sentencing Guidelines on the sentence imposed for any 
federal conviction in the future.”  (App. at 23.)   
 
II. DISCUSSION1 
 
Two questions are before us.  The first, raised by the 
government, is whether the relief that Ross seeks is 
cognizable under section 2255.  The second, pressed by Ross, 
is whether section 922(o) includes a mens rea element that 
requires the government to prove that a defendant had 
specific knowledge of a firearm’s characteristics.  Because we 
answer the first question in the negative, we cannot reach the 
second.   
 
Ross bases his section 2255 motion on the alleged 
ineffective assistance of his counsel at trial and on direct 
appeal.  He argues that those lawyers performed deficiently in 
failing to challenge the sufficiency of evidence presented to 
prove a violation of section 922(o) and in failing to object to 
the associated jury instruction.  We note at the outset that, had 
Ross challenged his conviction under section 922(o) on direct 
appeal, there is a fair likelihood we would have vacated that 
conviction and remanded for resentencing.2  But this case 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2253.  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
legal conclusions and apply the clearly erroneous standard to 
its factual findings.  Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 
290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002).   
2 Given the opportunity, we might join our sister 
circuits in holding that, to obtain a conviction under section 
922(o), the government must prove beyond a reasonable 
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comes before us now as a collateral attack on the conviction 
and sentence, not as a direct appeal, and the forms of relief 
remaining to Ross are severely limited by statute.  He may be 
right that the 922(o) conviction is unlawful, but, given the 
current posture of the case, not every wrong is in our power to 
                                                                                                     
doubt that the defendant knew of the characteristics of the 
firearm that render it a “machine gun” within the meaning of 
section 5845(b).  See United States v. Smith, 508 F.3d 861, 
866 n.3 (8th Cir. 2007) (requiring the government to prove 
that the defendant “knew he possessed a weapon with 
characteristics that made it subject to registration 
requirements”); United States v. Nieves-Castaño, 480 F.3d 
597, 599 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[T]he government’s burden is to 
prove that the defendant had knowledge of the characteristics 
that brought the gun within the statutory definition … .”); 
United States v. Camp, 343 F.3d 743, 745 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(“Pursuant to Staples, the Government must prove a 
defendant knew the weapon he possessed had the 
characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition of 
a machinegun.” (citations, emphasis, and internal quotation 
marks omitted)); United States v. McGiffen, 267 F.3d 581, 
589-90 (7th Cir. 2001) (requiring the government to prove 
defendant knew of the weapon’s characteristics that “bring it 
within the statutory definition”); United States v. Gravenmeir, 
121 F.3d 526, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding the district 
court properly instructed the jury that the government must 
prove “the defendant knew that the firearm was a 
machinegun”); United States v. Rogers, 94 F.3d 1519, 1523 
n.5 (11th Cir. 1996) (agreeing with the government that 
Staples’s reasoning applies with “equal force” to prosecutions 
under section 922(o)).   
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right.  We are bound by the text of section 2255.  That statute 
provides, in pertinent part:   
 
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court 
established by Act of Congress claiming the 
right to be released upon the ground that the 
sentence was imposed in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that 
the court was without jurisdiction to impose 
such sentence, or that the sentence was in 
excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is 
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move 
the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, 
set aside or correct the sentence. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (emphasis added).   
 
The strictures of section 2255 constitute a threshold 
test in addressing Ross’s post-conviction claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The viability of those claims, if we 
were to reach their merit, is determined by the familiar two-
part inquiry outlined in Strickland v. Washington, pursuant to 
which Ross has the burden of demonstrating (1) “that 
counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2) “that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”  466 U.S. at 
687.  The government contends, however, that, before getting 
to that inquiry, we must reject Ross’s claim because it is not 
cognizable under section 2255.  Even if Ross’s trial and 
appellate counsel provided objectively unreasonable 
assistance that prejudiced him, he still would not be entitled 
to relief, according to the government, because he is not 
“claiming the right to be released” from “custody.”  Ross 
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responds that controlling precedent establishes that the $100 
special assessment and the collateral consequences associated 
with the 922(o) conviction each constitute “custody” within 
the meaning of section 2255.   
 
A. $100 SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
The plain text of section 2255 provides relief only to 
those prisoners who claim the right to be released from 
“custody.”  The term “custody,” however, is not as 
straightforward as it may at first appear.  In McNally v. Hill, 
293 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1934), the Supreme Court held that 
discharge from physical confinement is the only relief 
available in a habeas corpus proceeding, but the Court 
reversed course in Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 66-67 
(1968), explaining that the concept of “custody” is expansive 
enough to encompass harms and remedies other than 
immediate discharge from physical confinement.  Since 
McNally, “our understanding of custody has broadened” to 
include many forms of restraint short of physical 
confinement, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 437 (2004).  
See, e.g., Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1968) 
(holding that, for mootness purposes, a petitioner is “in 
custody” if he is burdened by the “collateral consequences” of 
the challenged conviction); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 
236, 243 (1963) (holding that the conditions and restraints of 
a parole order constituted “custody”).  Despite the elasticity 
the word “custody” has acquired, precedent firmly establishes 
that the use of the term in federal habeas statutes is “designed 
to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy for severe 
restraints on individual liberty.”  Hensley v. Mun. Court, San 
Jose Milpitas Judicial Dist., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) 
(emphasis added); Barry v. Bergen Cnty. Prob. Dep’t, 128 
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F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 1997).  The Supreme Court has 
distilled a three-part test for deciding what constitutes 
custody: the restraints on the petitioner must be (1) severe, (2) 
immediate (i.e., not speculative), and (3) not shared by the 
public generally.  Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351-53; Ira P Robbins, 
Habeas Corpus Checklists 465 (2014-2015 ed.).   
 
We have not previously considered whether a 
monetary penalty such as the $100 special assessment 
associated with Ross’s conviction under 922(o) is a “severe” 
restraint on a defendant’s individual liberty, but the answer 
must be no.  Supreme Court decisions holding that a 
petitioner suffered from a “severe restraint” on liberty have 
emphasized the physical nature of the restraints.  Hensley, 
411 U.S. at 351 (emphasizing that the petitioner “cannot 
come and go as he pleases” and that his “freedom of 
movement rests in the hands of state judicial officers, who 
may demand his presence at any time and without a 
moment’s notice”); Peyton, 391 U.S. at 67 (1968) (holding 
that “a prisoner serving consecutive sentences is ‘in custody’ 
under any one of them”); Jones, 371 U.S. at 242 (“Petitioner 
is confined by the parole order to a particular community, 
house, and job at the sufferance of his parole officer.  He 
cannot drive a car without permission.”).  Our sister circuits 
have followed the Supreme Court’s lead.  See Calhoun v. 
Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that the requirement to register under state sex 
offender registration statute does not satisfy the “in custody” 
requirement because it involves no physical restraint), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 376 (2014); Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 
707, 718 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he collateral consequences of a 
conviction, those consequences with negligible effects on a 
petitioner’s physical liberty of movement, are insufficient to 
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satisfy the custody requirement.”); Williamson v. Gregoire, 
151 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that cases that 
find a severe restriction on a petitioner’s liberty “rely heavily 
on the notion of a physical sense of liberty – that is, whether 
the legal disability in question somehow limits the putative 
habeas petitioner’s movement”).  Ross does not and could not 
argue that the $100 special assessment imposes any 
restriction on his freedom of movement, because, of course, it 
does not.   
 
Our own precedent holds that the monetary component 
of a sentence is not capable of satisfying the “in custody” 
requirement of federal habeas statutes.  See Obado v. New 
Jersey, 328 F.3d 716, 718 (3d Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“The 
payment of restitution or a fine, absent more, is not the sort of 
‘significant restraint on liberty’ contemplated in the ‘custody’ 
requirement of the federal habeas corpus statutes.”); cf. Barry, 
128 F.3d at 161 (distinguishing “fine-only” sentences where a 
petitioner is not “in custody” from sentences that restrict a 
petitioner’s physical liberty on the basis that “fine-only” 
sentences “implicate only property, not liberty”).  Our sister 
circuits too have held that fines, restitution orders, and other 
monetary penalties are insufficient to meet the “in custody” 
requirement.  See Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 
2010) (holding that a restitution order alone is insufficient to 
trigger the “custody” requirement); Washington v. Smith, 564 
F.3d 1350, 1350 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of state 
habeas relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
with respect to the restitution amount, “because it does not 
attack a custodial aspect of Washington’s sentence and, thus, 
does not state a claim for relief under the habeas corpus 
statutes”); Mamone v. United States, 559 F.3d 1209, 1209-12 
(11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that a restitution order 
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cannot be challenged in a section 2255 motion because a 
claim seeking discharge or reduction of a restitution order 
does not claim the right to be released from custody, even if it 
accompanies other claims that actually claim the right to be 
released from custody; Erlandson v. Northglenn Mun. Court, 
528 F.3d 785, 788 (10th Cir. 2008) (“We agree with the 
district court that the payment of restitution or a fine, absent 
more, is not the sort of ‘significant restraint on liberty’ 
contemplated in the ‘custody’ requirement of the federal 
habeas statutes.”(brackets and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Kaminski v. United States, 339 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 
2003) (holding that a restitution order of $21,000 does not 
constitute “custody” within the meaning of section 2255); 
United States v. Bernard, 351 F.3d 360, 361 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(applying “the plain and unambiguous language” of section 
2255 to hold “that a federal prisoner cannot challenge the 
restitution portion of his sentence using 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 
because this statute affords relief only to prisoners claiming a 
right to be released from custody”); United States v. Segler, 
37 F.3d 1131, 1137 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that a $30,000 
fine was not a sufficient restraint on liberty to meet the “in 
custody” requirement of section 2255); United States v. 
Michaud, 901 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1990) (“A monetary fine is 
not a sufficient restraint on liberty to meet the ‘in custody’ 
requirement for § 2255 purposes.” (internal citations 
omitted)).  But see United States v. Jones, 403 F.3d 604, 607 
(8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the defendant’s Strickland claim 
merited relief under section 2255 in part because the 
defendant was required to pay a $100 special assessment, 
which the court stated constituted actual prejudice under 
Strickland); United States v. Bass, 310 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 
2002) (failing to cite Segler and stating that the defendant was 
prejudiced by his counsel’s ineffective assistance when he 
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was sentenced to pay an additional $50 assessment).  It seems 
clear, therefore, both as a matter of fact and law that Ross’s 
$100 special assessment does not constitute any meaningful 
restriction on his liberty, let alone a severe restriction 
cognizable under section 2255.   
 
Ross nevertheless argues that “a special assessment 
resulting from a wrongful conviction satisfies Strickland’s 
prejudice requirement” and that the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (1996), 
Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736 (1987) (per curiam), and 
Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985), “apply forcefully 
to show the prejudice of counsel’s deficient performance 
here.”  (Opening Br. at 29.)  We do not agree.  Rutledge is 
easily distinguishable.  In that case, the Supreme Court held 
that conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 is a lesser included 
offense of the crime of maintaining a continuing criminal 
enterprise, forbidden by 21 U.S.C. § 848.  517 U.S. at 307.  
The Court also held that the imposition of a special 
assessment constitutes “punishment” under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.  Id. at 301.  As a result, the Supreme Court 
concluded that imposition of a special assessment for 
convictions under both sections 846 and 848 “amounts to 
cumulative punishment not authorized by Congress.”  Id. at 
303.  But we are not concerned here with whether a special 
assessment constitutes “punishment” within the meaning of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause; instead, we must determine 
whether it constitutes “custody” within the meaning of 
section 2255.  Rutledge is of no help in that task.   
 
Ray also provides practically no guidance in answering 
the question before us.  In that case, the Supreme Court 
reviewed on direct appeal what has come to be called “the 
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concurrent sentence doctrine,” Ray, 481 U.S. at 737, which 
says, in essence, that “courts are free to pretermit decision 
about convictions producing concurrent sentences, when the 
extra convictions do not have cumulative effects.”  Ryan v. 
United States, 688 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 2012).  In Ray, the 
Fifth Circuit had invoked the concurrent sentence doctrine 
and declined to review one of the petitioner’s two convictions 
on direct appeal for possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute because the sentences on the two counts of 
possession were concurrent.  Ray, 481 U.S. at 737.  The 
Supreme Court vacated the decision, holding that the 
petitioner was not serving concurrent sentences because the 
district court had imposed a $50 special assessment on each 
of the three counts on which the defendant had been 
convicted.  Id.  The Supreme Court concluded that, “[s]ince 
petitioner’s liability to pay this total depends on the validity 
of each of his three convictions, the sentences are not 
concurrent.”  Id.  Thus, Ray establishes that, when a court 
orders a defendant to pay a special assessment for each of 
several counts of conviction, the sentences are not concurrent 
and the “concurrent sentence” doctrine cannot be used to 
avoid appellate review of each count of conviction.  The 
applicability of the concurrent sentence doctrine on direct 
appeal is, however, distinct from the question presented here, 
on collateral review under section 2255.  Ray simply does not 
advance Ross’s argument because it does not address the 
meaning of “custody.”   
 
In Ball, the Supreme Court held that duplicative convic 
tions cannot stand even if the sentences are concurrent 
because “[t]he separate conviction, apart from the concurrent 
sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that 
may not be ignored.”  470 U.S. at 865 (emphasis in original).  
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Such “adverse collateral consequences” included a potential 
delay in the defendant’s eligibility for parole, an increased 
sentence under a recidivist statute for a future offense, the use 
of the additional conviction to impeach the defendant’s 
credibility, and the societal stigma accompanying any 
criminal conviction.  Id.  Again though, Ball involved a direct 
appeal, not a habeas corpus petition under section 2255, and 
its discussion of the harm stemming from the collateral 
consequences of a felony conviction sheds no light on 
whether or not a monetary fine like a special assessment is the 
type of restriction on liberty that constitutes “custody” within 
the meaning of that statutory provision.   
 
Because we believe the burden of a special assessment 
– even one imposed in conjunction with a wrongful 
conviction – does not amount to “custody,” Ross is not 
“claiming the right to be released” from “custody” and his 
special assessment cannot serve as the basis for a claim under 
section 2255.   
 
2. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
 
The parties dispute whether a petition premised on the 
collateral consequences of an unlawful conviction, such as 
those identified in Ball, is cognizable under section 2255.  
Our own law does not answer the question, but we are not 
without guidance.  In Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 
(1989) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that, once a 
sentence for a conviction has completely expired, the 
collateral consequence of future sentencing enhancements 
potentially caused by that conviction is not itself sufficient to 
render an individual “in custody” for the purpose of a habeas 
attack.  Of course, the sentence for Ross’s conviction under 
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section 922(o) has not completely expired, but it is running 
concurrently with several other sentences.  This case thus 
seems analogous to Maleng, since Ross’s only additional 
harm stemming from the 922(o) conviction is whatever 
undefined collateral consequences may arise, not the term of 
imprisonment.  In the end, however, we do not have to decide 
whether, on these facts, the collateral consequences of a 
wrongful conviction amount to “custody” under section 2255, 
because Ross has not identified any such potential 
consequences.   
 
Though pressed at oral argument, Ross could not point 
to a collateral consequence not already existing as a result of 
his prior felony convictions or his seven other felony 
convictions in this case.  He says that, as a result of his 
wrongful conviction under section 922(o), he is subject to 
greater social stigma, his credibility could be attacked more 
easily at a future hearing or trial, he may be barred from 
obtaining the benefit of future changes to the law, or his 
eligibility for parole or the length of a future sentence could 
be affected if he is convicted of some future crime.  But, 
given his remarkably long rap sheet, which chronicles a 
lifetime of drug-related offenses and violent crimes, coupled 
with his seven other convictions in this case – including one 
unquestionably valid conviction for machinegun possession, 
namely count 7 – it is hard to see any significant collateral 
consequence originating from his conviction under section 
922(o), let alone one that rises to the level of “custody.”  
Indeed, most of the “collateral consequences” that he 
identifies are supported by nothing more than speculation, 
which is insufficient to establish “custody.”   
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Relying on Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), and 
a handful of cases that closely hew to it, Ross asserts that “[a] 
presumption of collateral consequences exists whenever a 
criminal defendant challenges his criminal conviction.”  
(Opening Br. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).)  He is 
incorrect.  Spencer did not hold that courts are to presume the 
existence of collateral consequences in all cases where a 
habeas petitioner challenges his conviction.  Instead, Spencer 
noted only that the Supreme Court has been “willing to 
presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing 
collateral consequences (or, what is effectively the same, to 
count collateral consequences that are remote and unlikely to 
occur),” 523 U.S. at 8, in order “to avoid mootness in 
challenges to conviction,” id. at 10.  Ross provides no reason 
why such a presumption should apply in a case like this, 
where mootness is not at issue.  But even if we were to 
indulge in that presumption, it would be rebutted here for the 
reasons we have already noted:  Ross’s lengthy criminal 
history, his multiple convictions in this case, and his 
concurrent sentences all undermine his claim that somehow 
his additional conviction will harm him in particular.   
 
In the absence of any plausible evidence of collateral 
consequences stemming from Ross’s section 922(o) 
conviction, there is no basis to conclude that such 
consequences render him “in custody” and eligible for relief 
under section 2255.   
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the 
District Court’s order denying relief and direct that Ross’s 
section 2255 motion be dismissed.   
